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issues with their Internet connectivity. In addition, many
end-users perceived those working within ISP’s as a group
of experts.

Abstract - The paper examines the advice and support provided
by seven major Internet Service Providers in Australia through
late 2009 and early 2010 in relation to computer and network
security. Previous research has indicated that many end-users
will attempt to utilise the support provided by Internet Service
Providers as a simple and effective method by which to obtain
key information in regards to computer security. This paper
demonstrates that in many cases the individuals working at the
help desk are either reluctant to provide IT security support or
have insufficient skill to provide the correct information.

Whilst an ADSL router may appear as a simple device, it
does permit an end-user to configure the device in a manner
which may either make the entire network vulnerable or
relatively safe from numerous types of attacks. New threats
to ADSL routers are emerging on a continuous basis [3, 4]
and as a result it is important that end-users apply
appropriate security mechanisms to their device. However,
applying secure configuration to the router does require a
certain level of skill and knowledge above that of the
average end user. As a result many end-users who lack this
knowledge of IT and security may find the process very
challenging and discouraging.

Keywords-component; SoHo; computer security; network
security; survey; internet service provider

I.

INTRODUCTION

The increasing popularity of broadband connectivity
worldwide is permitting individuals to share and access a
high-speed Internet connection easily. Numerous Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) are shipping ADSL routers
preconfigured with the client’s username and password thus
eliminating the difficulty faced by novice computer users in
accessing the Internet. However, these pre-configured
ADSL routers do not include pre-enabled security
mechanisms such as firewall rule sets, wireless encryption,
disablement of the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
(DHCP), or access control lists. Whilst omitting the security
mechanisms may reduce the time required to setup and use
the wireless network, it does expose the end-user to many
related threats.

An emerging and re-occurring threat to poorly secured
ADSL routers is malware. In the first quarter of 2009 new
forms of malware had been detected which targeted ADSL
routers. An ADSL Router based malware - Psyb0t was
hijacking consumer grade networking devices with the
intention of creating a sophisticated and un-detectable botnet
[3]. The malware acted on human ignorance. Consumers
may not always update the device’s firmware and change the
password from the default. As a result the malware was
distributed with a pre-populated list of 6,000 username and
13,000 password combinations which was able to infiltrate
many consumer ADSL routers. As a result these devices may
have not only attacked other networking devices, but may
also have significantly degraded an end-users online
experience.

Recent studies have identified two main concerns facing
the end-user. Firstly, much of the literature encompassed
with ADSL routers does not meet any publication standard
[1]. As a result this makes using product manuals tedious as
the process of locating information, navigating through
sections, often interpreting low resolution graphical images
and finding definitions for computer jargon creates a
significant burden on the end-user. Secondly, end-users are
in many instances faced with the dilemma of seeking IT
support from third parties to appropriately configure and
secure their networking devices [2]. In an Australian study
[2] conducted in 2009, individuals claimed that they relied
upon computer retail outlets and Internet Service Providers
(ISP) as a means by which to seek support and guidance for
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Specifically there are two initial security procedures that
can be applied to ensure that an ADSL router is protected
from threats such as malware. Firstly, the end-user should
change the username and password to something other than
the default [5]. The password should not be a dictionary
word and one that is sufficiently strong - normally greater
than fifteen characters. Secondly, the latest applicable
firmware update should be applied to the device which in
many cases due to sales or shipping delays can be several
revisions newer than the installed version [6]. Whilst the
first security technique is simple, the second security
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technique is reasonably technical and may stop many endusers from applying this effective safeguard.
ISP’s do allocate resources to creating a knowledge base
of computer and network security related support.
Unfortunately, a vast amount of this information may not be
updated or built upon for a considerable amount of time [7].
In the instance of the Westnet knowledge base, numerous
supportive pages are as much as three years out of date. In
addition specific advice relates to products or techniques
which are no longer viable for many modern operating
systems or security products. As a result, an end-user may
find this information difficult to utilize, further encouraging
them to contact the ISP via telephone for direct advice.
II.

Dodo
Optus

The researcher made contact two times with each ISP
via telephone. Each call was initiated at a different time and
day to increase the probability of communicating with an
alternative technical support person. The same questions
were used during each of the communications. The
researcher who is knowledgeable in the area used a form of
deception in that they undertook the entire conversation as a
naive and ill-skilled IT end-user. The technical support
individual was unaware as to whom they were directly
communicating with or the specific skill set of the caller. In
many instances ISP’s state that the conversation will be
recorded for training or educational purposes. The
researcher specifically requested that this be disabled prior
to the conversation. A series of three questions were
directed at each of the technical support individuals. Each
response was documented in terms of the actual support
provided, and the willingness and supportive nature of the
technical support. The three questions used in this study
included:

ANALYSIS OF ISP SUPPORT

Studying the perceptions and attitudes of computers users
has its merits in that researchers may identify the problems
that lead individuals into becoming victims of Internet
crime. This activity in turn permits countermeasures and
educational resources to be developed to ameliorate any
identified issues. Previous research has uncovered that many
end-users feel more comfortable communicating directly
with another individual whom they perceive to be an expert
in the field of security [8]. In addition, research has
identified that end-users actively communicate with an ISP
as a first point of contact as they perceive these groups to
have a broad spectrum of skill sets to address their computer
related issues.

x
x
x

To date there have been no studies which have analysed
and identified the merits of an end-user contacting an ISP to
seek advice. One of the advantages of utilising an ISP for
support is the availability of twenty-four hour and seven day
access to live support. In contrast many traditional computer
retail outlets may only be accessible for a fragment of this
time – during business hours. In addition, unlike a computer
retail outlet, there is no need for the end-user to leave their
home or office which may be convenient for an end-user
wanting to address their computer issue after hours [9].
Contacting an ISP has its virtues in that the end-user can be
directly in front of their computer or ADSL router should
step-by-step guidance be required.

I would like to secure my ADSL router. What
security measures or advice can you provide?
I plan on using a wireless network at home. Do I
need to do anything to secure my wireless
network?
Are there any additional security measures that you
believe I could apply for my computer, ADSL
router or network?

To further prepare for this research, a workstation and
ADSL router were setup with no security enabled. In the
event that the technical support person was willing to
provide step-by-step instructions, this would allow the
researcher to provide reasonable responses on the current
system state if questions were raised. The ADSL router
which was used was a D-Link G604t, which had wireless
enabled and all security settings disabled. The workstation
encompassed Microsoft Windows Vista Business, with
automatic updates disabled and no security applications
were installed.
It was not the aim of this study to criticise or expose
inadequate technical support within ISPs. Hence, to ensure
anonymity, each ISP will hereafter be referred to as ISP#-A
or ISP#-B etc. The number represents the ISP and the letter
represents the respondent with whom the researcher
communicated.

This paper investigates the security advice and guidance
provided by a number of popular Internet Service Providers
during a three month period spanning between 2009 and
2010. A total of seven ISPs within Australia were contacted
during this time which included;
x iinet
x Westnet
x Bigpond
x TPG
x iPrimus

III.

RESULTS

The results indicate that the majority of the ISPs used in
the study are reluctant to support naive and ill-skilled end-
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users when it comes to security. In addition, the support
provided by the various ISPs demonstrates that many of the
individuals working on the help desk have little knowledge
in computer and network security, and as a result provided
incorrect or inconsistent advice.

as they are difficult to find and more importantly
untrustworthy. ISP5-A response reveals a complete lack of
knowledge regarding ADSL routers. Whilst the devices do
in fact encompass features to secure the device, the simple
portrayal of the device as not being a securable entity may
in fact reasonably deter the end-user from locating or
applying any security measures. In this instance, it would
have been more appropriate for the employee to simply
state, that they were unaware, or unable to provide guidance
in this area.

From the seven ISP’s selected to participate in this study,
only one company refused to provide any support. At any
point in which a question concerning security was raised the
ISP in question would immediately respond with various
comments specifically detailing that they were not
authorised to provide computer or network security
assistance. Whilst this may be perceived as detrimental to
helping the end-users with security, it does prevent the ISP
from providing inadequate or flawed support. The
remaining six ISP’s provided varying degrees of support as
demonstrated by the analysis below.

In a number of instances the technical support
individual attempted to manipulate their way out of
answering the question. In particular ISP6-B raised the
comment that the device’s security is dependent on the state
of the computers to which it is connected. When this
comment was questioned, ISP6-B simply stated that the
Internet is accessed via the computers and that an ADSL
router is simply a converter of analogue and digital signals.
As a result the researcher was being convinced that ADSL
routers can simply not be secured by any manner.

A. Question 1 – ADSL router security
The first question that was raised to each ISP was
regarding general security advice for the ADSL router (DLink G604t). ISP1 when contacted both times employed
technical support individuals that were not only happy and
willing to provide guidance, but were also knowledgeable in
the area. In this instance, the help desk support employee
provided advice in terms of guiding the researcher through;
disabling the wireless radio, enabling Network Address
Translation (NAT), ensuring firewall rule sets were enabled,
and finally a step-by-step process of applying a full
firmware update. Whilst the employees provided
information in their own unique method the overall advice
was sound and applicable.

B. Question 2 – Wireless security
When each ISP was contacted on their recommendations
to ensure that the wireless network is secured, many failed
to provide adequate support. In two instances the researcher
was referred to the manual that was supplied with the ADSL
router. When the researcher questioned the resource and
stated that they could not understand the information
provided, the technical support individual reiterated that
everything that is needed to secure the wireless network is
supplied in the manual and that this should be referred to.
Alternatively the researcher was instructed to communicate
with the manufacturer of the device for further assistance.
These responses clearly do not address the reported issues
and does not assist an end-user in securing their device. In a
recent study [1] it was identified that ADSL router literature
supplied with many of the products does not meet any
specific publication standard. In addition, it was discovered
that in many instances the information supplied is flawed to
the point whereby the process of applying security would
either deter or confuse the end-user.

Alternatively, the remaining five ISP’s provided advice
which may have not only confused an end-user, but also
deterred them from applying any security. One of the
prevailing outcomes was the complete lack of awareness of
actually being able to apply ‘security’ to an ADSL router.
The various responses provided by the ISP’s support
included;
ISP5-A - “...ADSL routers do not have security settings...”

When ISP1 was contacted, as per the first question the
same high quality of support was re-iterated for providing
guidance for securing a wireless network. ISP1 provided
clear instructions to the researcher into how to implement
Wi-Fi Protected Access – Pre-shared Key (WPA-PSK)
encryption. WPA-PSK is a robust and secure data
encryption method and hence an ideal solution that each ISP
should be recommending. ISP1 employees also took it upon
themselves to question the necessity for using wireless in
the first place. In this case the potential threats and security
flaws of using this convenient yet problematic

ISP6-A - “...the Internet has plenty of information which
may be accessed freely...”
The responses demonstrate an overall deficient
approach in providing adequate support on these matters.
The comment provided by ISP6-A appears that the ISP is
attempting to shift the “supportive role” to information
located online. This behaviour contradicts previous research
in that Szewczyk and Furnell [2] identified that many endusers dislike utilising the Internet to locate helpful resources
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communication medium were explained ensuring that the
researcher was clearly aware of the potential pitfalls.

ADSL routers do not actually have any security
configuration settings that can be manipulated or applied.

Alternative comments by technical support staff at
alternative ISP’s were not as supportive. Four ISP’s stated
that providing advice or recommendations for securing a
wireless network is not part of their job description. One
technical support individual in particular was honest and
stated that they would have liked to provide assistance but
did not have the expertise to provide sufficient and correct
information. Additional comments made by staff employed
within ISPs are;

In relation to providing computer security support, the
respondents were slightly more educated. Firstly, ISP3-A,
ISP4-B and ISP5-B recommended that an anti-virus and
firewall product be installed. Secondly, ISP3 and ISP4
recommended that the Windows update feature be enabled
and configured so that updates are downloaded and installed
automatically. However, only ISP4 was able to provide the
researcher, a step-by-step walkthrough as to how to ensure
that Windows update was enabled. In addition ISP4 also
provided guidance on how to download a free version of an
anti-virus product. The support provided by ISP4 ended
there and no additional support was provided for installing
or setting up the product. The remaining phone calls
resulted in technical support individuals which were quite
unenthusiastic with comments including;

ISP1-A - “...you need to use WEP, find this in your manual
and follow the instructions...”
ISP6-B - “...you do not need to use any security for a home
wireless network...”
ISP1-A stated that the researcher should use Wired
Equivalent Privacy (WEP) and that the instructions would
be clearly located in the product manual. Whilst WEP does
provide a basic level security, it is not the paramount
solution available for wireless networking. The second
response is more interesting, in that the ISP6-B attempted to
convince the researcher that there was no need for security
if using a wireless network at home. After the researcher
questioned this in more detail, ISP6-B explained that it is
very uncommon for a home network to be targeted. To
further compliment this poor advice it was further stated that
any security mechanism that is applied would not only slow
down the wireless network, but may also make utilising the
network much more complex. The technical support
individual further added that incorporating a significantly
more complex method of operation would not be suitable
for a simple user. As with the previous question, five
respondents referred the researcher to seek advice from
shops and retailers specialising in computer and networking
products.

ISP1-A - “...you should consult Harvey Norman or a
computer shop for help...”
ISP3-B - “...search for computer security on Google...”
ISP6-B“...by default Windows is a secure software product,
it already incorporates a firewall and virus removal
products, so you should not waste money on third
party products...”
This study has identified that there is a continuous
promotion by the ISP to encourage end-users towards
seeking advice and purchasing goods from various IT
related retail outlets. The comment by ISP3-B suggests that
simply undertaking a search for computer security in
Google will provide plenty of adequate resources. As of
March 10th 2010, the exact same search in Google resulted
in very few relevant and more importantly simplistic
information resources that an end-user could potentially
utilise. This demonstrates that an end-user may in fact
struggle to locate appropriate information and in-turn may
eventually relinquish their quest to apply appropriate
security to their computer.

C. Question 3 – Extra security
The last question that the researcher asked referred to
any specific advice or recommendations for securing the
computer itself. In most instances the technical support
individual stated that they provide support with networking
and ISP related issues and not end-user computer security.
However, the technical support individual in most cases was
still able to provide guidance and suggestions. One of the
more significant and disturbing comments was that the
computer would be safe as it sits behind an ADSL router.
As a result there is no need to specifically configure or
install any additional security mechanisms on the computer
as the ADSL router will provide adequate security.
However, it was this same individual who also stated that

The comment by ISP6-B suggests that Windows is secure
by default. However, flaws and vulnerabilities are
continually published in both print and online resources.
These vulnerabilities depict the new threats which have
been discovered towards Microsoft Windows operating
systems [10, 11]. Furthermore, these comments may
diminish the probability that end-users will explore
literature to apply the appropriate security safeguards to
counter current and future threats.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

V.

The aim of this study was to investigate the advice and
recommendations provided by a number of popular ISP’s
within Australia. Previous research identified that many
end-users attempt to seek advice from ISPs as they believe
these experts are both trustworthy and knowledgeable in the
realm of computer and network security. This study has
shown that in most instances, an end-user will not be
provided with factual and appropriate information for
applying sufficient security. Whilst there isn’t a single
answer to addressing computer and network security issues,
there do exist ideal solutions which could be applied. In
particular numerous technical support staff stated that
Microsoft Windows by default is sufficiently secure.
However, this is not the ideal security strategy for an illskilled end-user.

1.

2.

3.

4.

Each response appears to be subjective to those who were
involved in the communication at the time of the
investigation. This does not necessarily reflect that all
technical support individuals would address each of the
issues in the same manner. One of the issues to consider
within this research is that end-users may perceive ISP
employees as experts and knowledgeable. However, further
investigation may reveal that the role of a technical support
individual may in fact be linked to a young adolescent
employee who has just begun their career in IT. Hence,
without adequate training and knowledge, the quality of
support that can be provided will be limited and possibly
flawed. End-users interpret ISP’s as a convenient and highly
accessible, twenty-four hour, seven day business. As a result
it could be perceived as beneficial, for ISPs to train their
employees to be able to provide at a minimum, an
elementary level of computer and network security support
to its customers.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.
This study has identified the quality of the support
provided by a number of ISPs within Australia. If an ISP
continues to provide misleading or inappropriate
information they should either make it clear upon answering
the call that they will not provide security related support, or
state this on their website. Until each ISP makes this
apparent to its customers, end-users will continue to have
misleading perceptions which will result in poor and
ineffective security approaches applied. This study inconjunction with previous research has identified that
computer retail outlets are perceived as also encompassing
the expert characteristic. Hence future work will examine
the advice and recommendations provided by computer
retail outlets in Australia – hopefully uncovering whom endusers may in fact trust in this deceitful online world.

10.
11.
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